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ABSTRACT 
 
A newfound security breach in the physical nature of single photon detectors that are generally 
used in quantum key distribution  is explained, we found that the bit contents of a quantum key 
transmission system can be intercepted from far away by exploiting the ultrawideband 
electromagnetic signals radiated from hi-voltage avalanche effect of single photon detectors. It 
means that in fact any Geiger mode avalanche photodiode that is used inside single photon 
detectors systematically acts like a downconverter that converts the optical-wavelength 
photons to radio-wavelength photons that can be intercepted by an antenna as side channel 
attack. Our experiment showed that the radiated waveforms captured by the antenna can be 
used as a fingerprint. These finger prints were fed to a deep learning neural network as training 
data, and after training the neural network was able to clone the bit content of quantum 
transmission. 
 
INTRODUCTION  
 
The superexponential time scales of the solutions provided by Quantum computers will likely 
soon break traditional public key cryptography, including the ciphers protecting most of the 
world’s digital secrets[1-3] . There are many accelerating efforts in development of new 
Quantum-resistant algorithms for post-quantum cryptography to define the public and private 
keys but none of them can claim to provide absolute security against future Quantum 
algorithms. It seems that the only reliable solution on hand at this time that claim absolute 
security in theory is Quantum cryptography. 
Based on the well-known Bohm’s version of the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen experiment [4,5]; 
the generalized Bell’s theorem [6,7] is used to test for eavesdropping. The extraordinary benefit 
offered by Quantum cryptography is that it is secure against all algorithmic and theoretical 
advances. For the high security applications, Quantum Key Distribution(QKD) also enables 
continuous secure communication by use of truly random one-time-pad keys[8]. 
The cryptographic security of QKD protocols does not rely on any assumptions about the 
resources available to the adversary and its only problem is that modelling of the 
implementation in quantum cryptography often enables deviations from an idealized model to 
be quantified. 
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CRYPTOGHRAPHIC SECURITY  
 
Existing fiber based and free space quantum optical links are trusted on the confidentiality of 
the transmitted bits by the physical properties of single photon transmission.This kind of trust 
is due to fundamental characteristic of quantum mechanics that any measuring on a quantum 
system causes disturbance in the system and  that a single quantum state cannot be perfectly 
cloned.[9-14]. In standard quantum cryptographic techniques like E91 and BB84, the 
transmitter generates  secret keys by encoding classical bit values of 0 and 1 using different 
quantum states of photons in different bases. In the receiver side, photon detectors measure the 
quantum states of the received photons and converts it to classical bits again. In theory, an 
eavesdropper disturbs the state of photons and causes bit errors that can be revealed by 
comparing parts of transmission by cooperation of Sender and Receiver[10,15-16]. 
Since practical protocols emerged starting in the 1980’s and 1990’s, QKD has evolved into a 
thriving experimental field, and is rapidly becoming a solid commercial proposition. In addition 
to LEO satellite implementations[17], recent deployments with very low noise 
superconducting single-photon detectors (SPD) that exceeded 421 km[18] range have been 
reported. However, all theoretical approaches are based on this assumption that every physical 
element in the system is ideal and free of infirmity. In fact, practical implementations often 
deviate from the theory, which leaves loopholes for eavesdropping, especially in the physical 
layer. 
 
IMPLEMENTATION SECURITY  
 
Extensive studies and experiments over the past years has greatly improved implementation 
security of QKD. Methods for closing the most readily exploitable loopholes have been 
developed, but still when the perfect theories of Quantum key transmission are implemented 
in real world, there are many imperfections.  
There are many researches that try to reveal the imperfections of standard protocols regarding 
the physical limitations like multi-photon emission, weak coherent states, detectors with basis-
dependent efficiency, misaligned sources and detectors, and timing jitter of SPDs [20,21]. A 
summary of typical side-channel attacks against QKD systems including the new technique 
(subject of this paper) is listed in Table 1 [22]. 
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Security Issue 
 
 
Description 
 
Countermeasures 
Trojan-horse attack  
 
Intruder probes the QKD equipment with light 
to gain information about the device settings  
 
privacy amplification (PA), 
isolators, filters  
 
Multi-photon emission  
 
When more than one photon is emitted in a 
pulse, information is redundantly encoded on 
multiple photons  
 
PA, characterization,  
decoy states, SARG04 and other 
protocols  
Imperfect encoding  
 
Initial states do not conform to the protocol  
 
PA, characterization  
 
Phase correlation 
between signal pulses  
 
Non-phase-randomized pulses leak more info 
to Intruder, decoy states fail  
 
phase randomization, PA  
 
Bright-light attack  
 
Intruder manipulates the photon detectors by 
sending bright-light to them  
 
active monitoring, measurement 
device independent QKD (MDI-
QKD)  
 
Efficiency mismatch 
and time-shift attack  
 
Intruder can control, at least partially, which 
detector is to click, gaining information on the 
encoded bit  
 
MDI-QKD,detector 
summarization  
 
Back-flash attack  
 
Intruder can learn which detector clicked and 
hence knows the bit  
 
isolators, MDI-QKD, detector 
summarization  
 
Manipulation of Local 
Oscillator reference  
 
In continuous variable QKD (CV-QKD), the 
local oscillator (LO) can be tampered with by 
Intruder if it is sent on a communications 
channel  
 
Generate LO at the receiver. Phase 
reloading, i.e. only synchronize the 
phase of LO 
laser damage attack 
 
creating deviations that leads to side channels 
by laser-damage 
 
Continuous monitoring of 
channels 
 
RF fingerprint attack  
(subject of this paper) 
 
Clones single photon detections by using 
Avalanche electromagnetic pulses 
Compact assembly, Shielding and 
Jamming 
 
Table1-List of attacks against a typical QKD system 
 
 
THE NEW  MENACE :  ELECTROMAGNETIC FINGERPRINT OF AVALANCHE PHOTO 
DIODES  
 
The most common single-photon detectors used in QKD as shown in Fig. 1-a, are Avalanche 
Photo Diodes (APDs) operating in reverse bias voltages above the breakdown voltage (Geiger 
mode), usually over 100Volts. In the Geiger mode the APD becomes so sensitive that detects 
a single incoming photon. The received photon in detector triggers an avalanche of electrical 
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current, when the current crosses a certain threshold a digital pulse in the output corresponds 
to photon detection. After that a quenching process sweeps out the avalanche after-currents and 
prepares the detector for detecting another photon. Direct measurements of discharge current 
called  ID(t) can show that it has a typical peak current around 10 mA and pulse width of 10 ns 
with an exponential decay waveform convoluted with a gaussian distribution.  
It have been proved experimentally[23], that the charge which is released during the breakdown 
in a short time produces emissions which generates a fluorescence flash of light. 
In addition to light emission during avalanche, we can also expect radiation in RF wavelengths 
too, because we are facing an accelerating charge in the avalanche process and electrodynamics 
theories show that we always have far-field electromagnetic radiations when we have an 
accelerating charge. In the geometrical scales of an APD we can approximate the total charge 
of the avalanche pulse by a point charge. By integrating the discharge current over the pulse 
from rise time (tr) to fall time (tf) a total charge QD can be calculated by:  
 
𝑄𝐷 = ∫ 𝐼𝐷(𝑡)𝑑𝑡
𝑡𝑓
𝑡𝑟
                                    (1) 
 
By using the non-realistic electrodynamics of an accelerating point charge we can  describe 
radiation by using Lienard-Wiechert  potential [24], hence by integrating the poynting vector  
over a sphere the energy radiated per unit time will be :  
 
𝑃 =  
2
3
 
𝑄𝐷
2
𝑐3
 (
𝑑𝑣
𝑑𝑡
)
2
    𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑣
𝐶
≪ 1                       (2) 
 
In which P is the total electromagnetic power radiated from the APD, c is speed of light and 
dv/dt  is the acceleration of charge assuming charge speed is much less than c.  
From a physical point of view we can say that this process is a kind of down conversion 
occurred in the APD in a form that it converts Optical-wavelength photons to Radio-
wavelength photons. From the viewpoint of security this phenomena is a unique feature for 
each APD because physical location of each APD in surrounding structure and environment is 
unique and by exploiting the radiation of its RF pulse in the box, shelf, rack, room, etc., the  
mechanical structure of the environment around the APD acts like a Finite Impulse 
Response(FIR) filter with unique weights that  produces a fingerprint for each APD As shown 
in Fig. 1-b. 
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A TYPICAL PENETRATION SCENARIO 
 
Based on mentioned approach many practical scenarios for penetration to a QKD system can 
be proposed. The proposed approach can be used as a practical Penetration Test (PENTEST) 
mechanism for ethical hack and evaluating robustness of Quantum cryptography networks that 
are using single photon based QKD protocols. This approach can be used either in free-space 
or fiber-optic QKD  systems as long as eavesdropper can receive radio waves of the detectors. 
Also the same concept can be used against the Entanglement-based systems. 
Figure 1 
 
 
 
Avalanche photodiode as a single Photon Detector acts like a  downconverter that converts Optical-wavelength 
single photons to Radio-wavelength photons.(a)Typical circuits of APD for single photon detection, by receiving 
a single photon hi-voltage avalanche pulse produces RF radiated pulse. (b)Mechanical structure of the system, 
room and buildings around APD acts like a filter that  produces a unique response by multiple reflections for 
each APD as a fingerprint . 
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One of the popular protocols for QKD is BB84 shown in Fig.2a. In this protocol the idea is to 
encode every bit of the secret key into the polarization state of a single photon. Because the 
polarization state of a single photon cannot be measured without destroying this photon, this 
information will be ‘fragile’ and not available to the eavesdropper. The protocol then runs in 
the following steps:  
Transmitter (called Alice) sends a sequence of single photon polarized differently. Alice 
encodes zeroes into H-polarized(0 ֯ ) photons while unities she encodes into V-polarized 
photons (90 ֯ ). But this happens only in half of the cases. The other half of bits, chosen 
randomly, are encoded using a diagonal polarization basis. Then, the A ( 45 ֯ ) polarization 
corresponds to zero and the D ( 135 ֯ ) polarization, to unity.  The receiver (called Bob), 
measures polarization of photons using a detection setup shown in Fig.2a. by this setup receiver 
can distinguish between H and V polarizations in half of the cases in the  ‘+’ basis. But in half 
of the cases randomly receives photons in another ‘x’ basis.  After transmitting a certain number 
of bits, Bob announces which basis he used for each bit in a classical communication link. then 
Alice reveals in which bits they used the same bases. They ignore the bits with different bases, 
and use only those bits with the same base. After this process the keys are sifted and the length 
of the key is decreased, but the remaining has randomness and coincidence. Then, they must 
check eavesdropping by checking the error rate. The test for this criteria is based on 
Experimental Bell’s test [25] based on S which is: 
 
𝑆 ≡ |〈𝜎𝛼𝜎𝛽〉 + 〈𝜎𝛼𝜎𝛽′〉 + 〈𝜎𝛼′𝜎𝛽〉 − 〈𝜎𝛼′𝜎𝛽′〉| ≤  2               (3) 
 
 
With correlators: 
 
⟨σaσb⟩ = (1/Na,b)(N↑↑a,b+N↓↓a,b−N↑↓a,b−N↓↑a,b)            (4) 
 
Here NABa,b denote the number of events with the respective outcomes A, B for measurement 
directions a, b and Na,b is the total number of events of the respective measurement setting. 
Violation of this inequality can be predicted by quantum mechanics when measurements are 
performed on maximally entangled states: 
 
|Ψ±⟩=(1/√2)(|↑⟩|↓⟩±|↓⟩|↑⟩)                                                       (5) 
 
with certain measurement settings, e.g., α=0°, α′=90°, β=45°, β′=135° . 
To this end, Alice and Bob take a part of the key for instance, (10%) and compare it. This 
procedure is also public, but these 10% are then discarded. If there was an eavesdropping then, 
the key would contain errors and the whole key is thrown out and the procedure is repeated. 
The proposed penetration setup for this protocol is shown in Fig.2b andFig.2c. The penetration 
in performed in the learning and intercept steps as following :  
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I-Learning:  
A laser is equipped with a polarization rotator that is synchronized with a precision pulse 
generator that sends the test photons with random orthogonal polarizations  towards the target 
receiver(Fig. 2b). To achieve a solid relation between received bits and the quantum system, 
Eve must insert this laser ( that operates in the same wavelength of QKD system) into the link. 
This laser imitates the Quantum link’s laser. Each single photon detector in the target system 
receives the test photons and generates Hi-voltage avalanche pulses that radiates 
Ultrawideband (UWB) Electromagnetic pulses (EMP). The EMP generated by avalanche 
photo-diodes will leak through electromagnetic shields because of high voltage and short pulse-
width that produces high bandwidth. This fact have been tested and verified in our experimental 
setup with two commercial brands of Single Photon Detectors(SPD). 
The  penetration system is equipped with an ultra-wideband antenna that receives the radiated 
electromagnetic Pulses.  This antenna receives weak avalanche leakages which permits the 
signal processing section to extract fine differences between pulse fingerprints. The EMP 
signals are amplified with a low-noise amplifier and excessive noise caused by power lines, 
mobile communications, etc. is filtered by band-pass and band reject filters. The resulting pure 
signal is fed to a single-event transient digitizer  that is synchronized with the same precision 
pulse generator that triggers laser pulses. 
After preparing the setup, the ultrawideband receive-only antenna with accompanying low-
noise amplifier and filter must be located as close to the target photon-detectors as possible. 
In this step some test photons are sent to the target by Eve. First random polarizations for 
transmitted single photons are selected and by receiving RF pulses a histogram of polarizations 
is formed which the peak of histogram shows the right polarization. After that random locations 
for the antenna is selected and locations are improved incrementally by a successive 
approximation algorithm. In the signal processor successive integration of the test pulses are 
performed to achieve highest possible signal-to-noise ratio (SNR).Strong and discriminated 
waveforms captured by the signal processor are stored in the memory as a reference for 
machine learning training. In this stage Alice and Bob know that eavesdropping took place 
because the keys would contain excessive errors. Then the whole key is thrown out and the 
BB84 procedure is repeated again by Alice and Bob. 
 
II-Key Intercept:  
In this step of the operation(Fig 2c), Eve’s laser is removed and the target QKD system operates 
in its normal condition and the Eve starts to capture avalanche signals of the SPDs. The signal 
processor and the artificial intelligence engine recognizes the received signals in a free-running 
form without any trigger signal. By this configuration Eve doesn’t need to make any 
interference in QKD path and her only source of information is the classical communication 
path and the SPD’s RF backdoor, hence from the viewpoint of information theory in ideal form 
(which the Artificial Intelligence engine can perfectly identify different SPD waveforms 
without error) Eve has access to the same information of Bob.  It is worth mentioning that the 
techniques proposed for waveform detection in this setup are mature techniques that are used 
normally in Ultrawideband Radars and electronic warfare systems [26-31]. 
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Figure 2 
 
  
Penetration  setup for a Quantum Key Distribution system: (a)Typical BB84 QKD system, (b)Penetration Training phase, 
(c)Eavesdropping phase . 
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EXPERIMENTAL SETUP  
 
To evaluate the possibility of automatic differentiation between fingerprint of  radio waves that 
are received from different SPD locations we prepared a setup shown in Fig. 3 according to 
ITU standards [32]. The setup was including a digital Scope as transient digitizer, an 
Ultrawideband antenna and two commercial single photon detectors with same 
model/manufacturer. 
After setting up the components, 64 waveforms were captured from each SPD with 1GS/s 
sampling rate and 1200 samples per waveform. Fig. 4 shows one of the captured raw 
waveforms corresponding to a synchronous digital pulse created by SPD. The TTL output pulse 
of the APD is used as a synchronization pulse for precise data acquisition from the antenna. 
 
 
 
Figure 3 
 
 
 
 
Eexperimental  setup: The RF radiations caused by avalanche breakdown emissions of single photon detectors are 
captured by ultrawideband antenna and recognized by a Neural Network after pre-processing. 
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SIGNAL PROCESSING  
 
In the signal processing procedure, we removed the noises and irrelevant portions of the signal 
by frequency domain excision (filtering ) and time domain excision. The frequency domain 
excision shown in Fig. 5 removes both low-frequency noises induced by sources like powerline 
and high frequency noises that appear in the background when no signal is present. After 
removing noises by frequency domain excision, the signal samples were decreased from 1200 
samples to 256 samples per waveform by time domain excision, in a way that noises before 
and after the signals of interest were cut out from the signals. This operation not only increases 
the signal-to-noise ratio but also removes the effect of irrelevant parts of the signal that contains 
no information from further processing. To perform a correlation analysis we made an 
Figure 4 
 
 
Real ultrawideband Electromagnetic pule produced by Hi-voltage avalanche impulse of APD: (a)Raw 
waveform captured by the ultrawideband antenna, (b)TTL output pulse of the APD used as trigger for 
signal acquisition. 
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additional processing to normalize each waveform. This normalization was performed by 
dividing each sample to the total power of the waveform.  
 
 
Figure 5 
 
 
 
 
 Noise removal by frequency domain excision: (a)Signal before filtering, (b) Signal after filtering, (c)Spectrum before 
filtering, (d)Spectrum after filtering. 
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Before any further processing, to obtain an overview about the amount of decorrelation of the 
waveforms captured from two separate SPDs, we picked a waveform from first SPD as a 
reference. Then we calculated the absolute value of cross-correlations of this reference with 64 
waveforms of the same SPD and 64 waveforms of the second SPD, the results are shown in 
Fig. 6. Here we put the correlation results of the SPD1 (named co-location) and SPD2 (named 
cross-location) beside each other on a common scale to have an overview and physical sense 
about the amount of decorrelation. This decorrelation can be described as a fingerprint for each 
SPD by this physical property that impulses from each Avalanche photodetector experience 
different paths and reflections from the physical objects around (mounting boxes, shelf, rack, 
walls of the room, …) that act like systems having different impulse responses, let’s call them 
h1[n] and h2[n] in discrete-time form. Then if we recall that the impulse produced by each 
Avalanche photodiode is similar to a Dirac delta function that we call it δ[n] then  if we take 
64 waveforms from SPD1 and 64 waveforms from SPD2 we should have the following 
waveforms: 
 
W1[n , i] =  h1[n] * δ1 [n , i]  + N[n , i]  + Q[n , i]          ;  i=1 to 64   (6) 
 
W2[m , i]= h2[m] * δ2 [m , i] + N[m , i]  + Q[m , i]       ;  i=1 to 64  (7) 
 
 
In which, W1[n , i] is the i-th waveform received by the antenna from SPD1, h1[n] is the 
impulse response of the path from SPD1 to the antenna, δ1 [n ,i] the i-th impulse of the 
Avalanche photodiode of SPD1 after detecting a single photon and N[n ,i]  is the additive white 
Gaussian thermal noise of the receiving system and Q[n,i] is the quantization error of the 
transient digitizer which is modelled as an additive random noise.  
Here m=n + Δt in which Δt is caused by time difference of arrival of waveforms to antenna 
due to different distances of each SPD to antenna. 
There are three sources that construct each waveform: the SPD, the radiation path, and the 
receiving system. The main player that has the first role in making decorrelation between SPD 
waveforms is the radiation path between two SPDs. As it can be seen in the captured signal’s 
spectrum there are three peaks in the FFT output that may correspond to resonance caused by 
the cavity of SPD box and shelf. The shelf was used to make the test scenario more realistic. 
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After obtaining an overview about the amount of decorrelation of waveforms, to make sure 
that there is enough decorrelation between fingerprints of two SPDs we calculated  matrices of 
co-location peak values and cross-location correlations of the waveforms. By this way we 
obtain two matrices as following: 
 
Mco[i , j]= peak{|Rij[ τ ]|}  ;  i , j =1 to 64  (8) 
Mcross[i , j]= peak{|Rij[τ ]|}  ;  i , j =1 to 64  (9) 
 
 
 
Figure 6 
 
 
 
Cross correlations of 64 waveforms captured from the SPDs in one place (Co-location) and two different places (Cross-
location) with 20 cm distance. 
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In which,  Rij[τ ]  is cross correlation of i-th and j-th waveforms and Mco   is co-location matrix 
and  Mcross  is cross-location matrix. To have a thorough view that makes sense in proof-of-
concept we made two 3-dimentional heat-map graphs that shows Mco   and  Mcross  correlation 
matrices in the same scale. The graphs are shown in Fig. 7. 
As it can be seen in the heatmap graphs,  in our proof-of-concept prototype, two SPDs were 
mounted 20 cm apart and there was enough decorrelation between two SPD locations, hence 
the correlation matrixes can be separated by a flat surface as a threshold. It means that an 
artificial intelligence algorithm may be used to learn and differentiate between the waveforms 
of each APD in a fast and automated way. A survey conducted on 2019[33]  shows that deep 
learning techniques can be effectively used in different wireless signal recognition scenarios  
and applying the raw signal to the Neural network without any preprocessing is becoming a 
trend in signal recognition. 
 
SIGNAL RECOGNITION USING DEEP LEARNING NEURAL NETWORK 
 
In this stage we  implemented a deep learning signal classification Neural network to 
differentiate between two SPD waveforms. In fact, this machine automates the recognition of 
decorrelations between waveforms after signal processing and filtering.   Fig. 8 shows a 
simplified view of the configuration of the deep learning Neural network used for training and 
waveform recognition. 
In our proof-of-concept setup we used half of the waveforms for training purpose and half  
for test. Our  Neural network’s number of  input neurons was equal to the number of samples 
of input signal. after time-excision, each input neuron was containing a time-sample of a 
waveform , then we made hidden layers of fully interconnected neurons and finally prepared 
one output neuron with binary output which is trained to deliver two values representing the 
received waveforms of SPDs  in which ‘zero’ corresponds to SPD1 and ‘one’ corresponds to 
SPD2. After training we applied the test waveforms to the network and the results showed that 
the network can classify the waveforms received from each SPD with an accuracy of better 
than 99.7 percent. It shows that we can clone most of the single photon bits received in Bob 
side with very low error rate and violate the quantum safety of the QKD link. 
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Figure 7 
 
 
 
Cross-correlation matrices made by 64 waveforms captured in one place(Co-location) and two different places(Co-location) :    
(a) Cross-correlation matrix of 64 waveforms captured from  SPDs in different locations. (b) Correlation matrix of 64 
waveforms captured from an SPD in one location. 
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DISCUSSION  
 
Experimental tests on commercial SPDs showed that the ultrawideband high-voltage EMP of 
avalanche photodiodes can penetrate through the shielding of SPDs and can be intercepted by 
an eavesdropper without touching the error rate of the quantum link . In this experiment we 
have shown that it is possible to capture and differentiate between impulses received from 
different SPDs by propagation of fingerprint of signals. During the tests it have been observed 
that fingerprint decorrelations are highly dependent on the spacing between two SPDs. 
Reduction of spacing not only increases the pattern-recognition error rate of the Eavesdropper 
but also increases the thermal and quantization noise of the transient digitizer because of need 
for more bandwidth and sampling speed. This causes more error in the Eve’s side than Bob’s.  
It can be said that although this experiment is not the end of the matter for Quantum key 
distribution but it shows that any secure communication system that relies on absolute safety 
of quantum transmission must also include relevant Cyber-physical and Electronic warfare 
techniques (like high shielding and Jamming), to ensure that any kind of hostile use of 
electromagnetic spectrum (not only the light wavelengths) should be seriously taken into 
consideration. 
As a conclusion we can say that our experiment showed that at least the following provisions 
should be seriously prepared for every Quantum-secured communication system: 
 
1- Assembling the SPDs as close to each other as possible 
2- Maximum Electromagnetic shielding  utilization in physical layer 
3- Including a wideband Electromagnetic jammer inside the Quantum receiver system 
Figure 8 
 
 
 Deep learning Neural Network classifies waveforms of each SPD. After learning it can differentiate the fingerprint 
of the signals coming from SPDs different locations. 
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METHODS 
 
The feasibility study of this project was performed using a home-made, passively quenched 
single photon detector based on Geiger APDs. We used two types of commercial ADP unites 
with 500μm diameter active area and hermetically sealed metal package, the first one was  type 
SAP500 from ‘Laser components’ and the second one C30902SH-TC from ‘Excelitas 
Technologies’. After positive results of the feasibility study, in the next level of experiments 
we used a commercial single photon detector type ID100 from ‘ ID Quantique SA’ company that 
is an active and famous company in the Quantum security business with mature professional 
QKD products.  
Signal reception was performed using a home-made wideband antenna with 0dB gain and a 
wideband digital oscilloscope with 1GS/s sample rate. The distance between two SPDs were 
20 cm and distance between SPD setup and receiving antenna was 2 meters . In order to 
eliminate any uncertainty that may cause by moving objects, the transient recorder was 
remotely controlled via LAN connection. All signal processing and transforms was performed 
using MATLAB’s  signal processing toolbox. Signal Bandpass filtering was performed by FFT 
excision with cut-off frequency of 30 MHz to 300 MHz . The Neural network training and tests 
was performed using MATLAB’s Deep learning toolbox. We implemented a deep learning 
Neural network with 256 inputs, each containing a time-sample of a waveform , then we made 
5 layers of fully interconnected hidden neurons and one binary output neuron that presents the 
bit information of quantum transmission. 
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